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I’m not sure how this one passed me by, but on December 4th, the Guardian published a Wikileaks extract which relates  the outcomes of discussions between US Embassy staff and African leaders regarding the increasing role of China on the continent.

I’ve already made it clear that I think the Chinese role is not nearly as worrisome as it’s been made out to be, though subsequent reading on the situation in Zambia suggests that terrible Chinese labour practices have been exported along with their money and expertise in mining and road building. One of the key messages of my previous piece on China was that Africa likes the way China does business, despite all the worries the West has, and wants other donors to be more like them. This is spelt out in stark language in the leaked cable:

China's fast, efficient, "no strings attached" bilateral approach is popular in the region, as is the PRC preference for infrastructure over governance projects. African officials fear that U.S. or European interference will slow down the assistance process and tie conditions to Chinese aid. In the past, the EU angered many African countries when it proposed trilateral cooperation. The Chinese subsequently backed out of discussions citing lack of African support. In addition, African officials believe that competition between donors has had positive consequences for African development, giving the African countries options after several decades of a largely "Western" development model.
Firstly, this makes it completely explicit that China’s focus on productive activities, done quickly and without linking them to anything that does not directly concern their success is far more popular than the more involved, convoluted way the Western donors try to impose conditionality-by-stealth through a complex system of linked aid projects and general budget support. Secondly, it makes it clear that African governments are probably more keen on competition than coordination, which will probably please Owen Barder, who sees this as key to the positive evolution of the aid system. I’m agnostic on this one: I think competition is good, but the basic incentives of aid are so confused it may not work exactly the way it should (i.e. fostering specialisation according to comparative advantage). A bit of both coordination and competition would be ideal. The basic message is spelt out with clarity that no-one can possibly misinterpret:
Africans don't want conditions, they want options
The effect of competition has already been felt, the cable suggests:
[South African Minister Dave Malcolmson] recalled that after the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, when China announced its commitments to Africa to much international media fanfare, traditional donors changed their attitude. They recognized that they had to measure up to China and "came calling." The EU proposed infrastructure projects (after having defacto given up supporting these types of projects) and the World Bank began to support more agriculture projects.
I’ve noted this as well. This is a really good thing, a renewed focus on the economy after more than a decade of neglect in favour of social development and governance. However, is this really how competition should work? They are trying to one-up one another, not to focus on areas where they can best make a case for being the lead donor. I think it will take a few years before we see how this reaches equilibrium. Hopefully it will lead to a situation where two or three donors of very different backgrounds will dominate each sector, reducing burden on recipient Governments but providing a broad coverage of support across sectors and competition within them.

An example of the kind of approach I’d like to see was also praised by Malcolmson:

He cited the DFID's relationship with China as an example of healthy cooperation. DFID's success has come from focusing on small projects and working largely outside formal channels…
More interesting words were expressed (after the jump):

[Kenyan Ambassador to China, Julius Ole] Sunkuli said Africans were frustrated by Western insistence on capacity building, which translated, in his eyes, into conferences and seminars. They instead preferred China's focus on infrastructure and tangible projects.
This actually makes my heart sing a little. I work in capacity building, and I share the same frustrations Sunkuli expresses here. The vast majority of skills development work I’ve done needs no budget, no seminars and no conferences. Maybe a couple of training sessions with virtually no cost (a Government meeting room and everyone brings their own laptop is my standard approach – anyone who doesn’t come unless there’s a beach and a fancy hotel probably doesn’t care so much about skills development anyway). I’m constantly amazed at how much donors manage to spend on teaching 10 people how to use a database – and at how few people can use the said database after three months.

One final note: I think this cable reflects very well indeed on the US administration. It shows that they are taking the role of new donors seriously, and put real stock in the words and opinions of African leaders.

Categories: Africa Aid
Tags: China

5 Comments

Ryan · January 31, 2011 at 07:47 PM

One thing that I found interesting is that when Africans tended to be hesitant of US-China cooperation in African development projects, it was usually because they feared that US involvement would hamper China's effectiveness. That angle has been entirely missed by the media. I wrote a little bit about this and related topics here: http://africanarguments.org/2011/01/wikileaks-china-the-us-and-africa/

ant · January 31, 2011 at 08:23 PM

btw...Dave Malcolmson is not a South African minister. He is some official in the South African diplomatic corp

Ranil Dissanayake · February 01, 2011 at 06:01 AM

Ryan - you're right, that is interesting. But I'm not so sure it's surprising. Most donors move quite slowly, and China is in a small minority for which mobilisation and disbursement of resources occurs quickly.

With most joint aid projects, unless the slower donor disburses money through the faster one (which would be very unlikely with the US through China, since they don't do that except with the UN, WB and very limited other situations), the aid project only ever moves as fast as the slowest donor. That's why it never makes much sense to joint cooperation when a fast donor can provide all the money itself.

Ant - thanks for the heads up.

Ranil Dissanayake · February 01, 2011 at 06:04 AM

Ryan - That's a really good piece by the way.

Ryan · February 02, 2011 at 12:56 AM

Thanks Ranil. Yeah, most of what wikileaks has done on this topic is provide evidence for a lot of things that we thought we already knew.